Short Interest & Thesis

Short Interest & Thesis — monday.com Ltd (MNDY)

Bottom line. No official reported short interest, short-sale volume, borrow-fee, or public net-short disclosure was staged for MNDY — it is an Israeli foreign private issuer on NASDAQ for which the pipeline has no configured deterministic short-interest source, so reported positioning is not directly measurable here. The decision-relevant content is therefore the short thesis, not a position count — and that thesis is unusually clean: a valuation / growth-deceleration / AI-disruption case with no leverage, no going-concern question, and no credible fraud allegation, which has already paid off in a roughly 55% drawdown from the December 2025 high. The strongest evidence is the company's own guidance (FY2026 revenue growth cut to 18–20% from ~27% in FY2025) and the quality-of-earnings footnote that FY2025 net income was entirely non-operating; the most important counterweight to any remaining short is a net-cash balance sheet funding an aggressive buyback that is actively shrinking a small (~51M-share) float.

Evidence availability — what is and is not measurable

Source: reported short-interest, short-sale-volume, borrow, and net-short classes are unavailable as staged (data/short_interest/ manifest and latest, all empty); narrative and liquidity rows are corpus/feed-derived.

Because no reported short position exists in the feed, days-to-cover, % of float short, and crowding cannot be computed. Anyone needing a hard positioning read must pull NASDAQ/FINRA bi-monthly short interest directly — it is not in this dataset. The honest institutional answer is that measured short interest is not decision-useful here; the thesis is.

The realized short payoff — a 55% de-rating already happened

Source: daily price feed, as staged (month-end closes, Dec 2025 – Jun 2026); not a corpus document.

The stock fell from a ~$150 high to ~$67, with the decisive leg (-37%) landing in February 2026 around the Q4 FY2025 print. That print cut FY2026 revenue guidance to a range of $1.452–1.462 billion, or 18–19% year-over-year growth, and management withdrew its previously communicated 2027 targets [1] — a sharp step down from the 26.7% revenue growth MNDY delivered in FY2025 (revenue rose to $1.232 billion from $0.972 billion) [2]. For a short, the de-rating is the payoff; the live question for a PM is whether the thesis still has legs from here or whether the easy money is already made.

Short-thesis ledger

There is no public short-seller report, activist campaign, or accounting allegation in the corpus or staged research — a targeted forensic web search for "short seller report allegations fraud" surfaced nothing decision-useful. The bear case is therefore a fundamental one, assembled from the company's own disclosures. Each leg below pairs the thesis claim with what MNDY itself discloses.

Sources: FY2026 guidance and withdrawn 2027 targets [3]; NDR 110% guided to decline [4]; consumption pricing shift [5]; revenue-concentration risk [6]; operating loss and non-operating income [7]; tax-benefit / valuation-allowance reversal [8]; founder veto share [9]; NIS appreciation and Israel risk [10].

On the strongest leg — earnings quality. MNDY reported FY2025 GAAP net income of roughly $119 million, but the audited statement of operations shows an operating loss of $(1.7) million; the profit comes entirely from $61.1 million of net financial (interest) income on the cash pile plus a $59.4 million income-tax benefit [11]. That tax benefit is itself driven by a one-time reversal of the deferred-tax valuation allowance (the allowance fell from ~$62 million to zero) [12]. A short would argue "GAAP-profitable" overstates the operating reality; the rebuttal is that the cash earnings are real — adjusted free cash flow was strong and the interest income is a durable feature of a debt-free, cash-rich balance sheet, not an accounting trick.

The counterweight — net cash and an aggressive buyback shrinking a small float

This is what makes MNDY a poor mechanical short despite a live fundamental bear case. The balance sheet carries $1.50 billion of cash plus $162 million of marketable securities and no debt [13], removing any leverage, covenant, or going-concern lever a short could pull. Against that, the company is buying stock aggressively into the drawdown: a board-authorized program of up to $870 million was approved in September 2025 [14], with ~$735 million still available exiting FY2025 [15] and an accelerated repurchase in Q1 FY2026 that left only ~$182 million remaining — implying roughly $550 million bought back in a single quarter [16].

Sources: 51,160,822 ordinary shares outstanding [17]; buyback pace [18]; market cap and ADV derived from the price feed, as staged.

The setup that emerges: a small ~51M-share float being actively reduced by a multi-hundred-million-dollar buyback, with no measurable short position to size against it. If a meaningful short were on, the combination of low absolute share count, ~1.8M-share ADV, and a persistent company bid would make covering costly into any positive surprise — i.e. squeeze risk runs against shorts. But that is an inference about mechanics, not an observed crowding read, because no reported short interest exists in the feed. The founder veto share also caps the classic takeover catalyst [19], so a short cannot lean on "no floor from a bid" the way it could elsewhere.

Market setup — how positioning colors the catalysts

The next prints are guidance-credibility tests, not positioning events. Q1 FY2026 actually came in better than feared — revenue of $351 million, up 24% year-over-year, with NDR holding at 110% — and the full-year range was nudged up to $1.466–1.475 billion (19–20% growth) [20] [21]. Asymmetry from here is two-sided: the bear's growth-and-AI thesis is intact and unproven-wrong, but a stock down ~55% with a net-cash buyer of last resort and no observable short crowding offers limited mechanical fuel for a fresh leg down purely on positioning. The real swing factor is whether the consumption-pricing transition and AI monetization re-accelerate net-new ARR or further muddy the growth signal [22].

Evidence quality

Source: classification per the staged data/short_interest/ feed (empty) and the corpus citations used above.

Net read for a PM. Short positioning is unmeasurable here, so it should not drive sizing or timing on its own. The short thesis is coherent and partly proven by the de-rating, but it is a quality-of-growth and AI-disruption argument — not a fraud, leverage, or liquidity story — and it runs into a net-cash balance sheet and a float-shrinking buyback that make MNDY a structurally awkward short. Treat the thesis as a reason to underwrite the growth/AI question carefully, not as evidence that the tape is positioned for a positioning-driven move in either direction.